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Abstract 
Resource-poor yet blissful Switzerland is also one of the most food-secure countries in the world: 
there are abundant food supplies, relatively low retail prices in terms of purchasing power parity, 
with few poverty traps. Domestic production covers 70% of net domestic consumption. A vast and 
efficient food reserve scheme insures against import disruptions. 
Nonetheless, the food security contribution by the four sectoral policies involved is mutually 
constrained: our agriculture is protected by the world’s highest tariffs. Huge subsidies, surface 
payments, and some production quotas substitute market signals with rent maximisation. Moreover, 
these inefficiencies also prevent trade and investment policies which would keep markets open, 
development policies which would provide African farmers with the tools to become more 
competitive, and supply policies which would work against speculators. The paralysing effect of 
Swiss agricultural policies is exacerbated by new “food security subsidies” in the name of “food 
sovereignty” while two pending people’s initiatives might yet increase the splendid isolation which 
in effect reduce Swiss farmer competitiveness and global food security. 
Is there a solution? Absent a successful conclusion of the Doha Round (WTO) or a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) further market openings and a 
consequent “recoupling” of taxpayer support to public goods production remain highly un-likely. To 
the very minimum Switzerland should resume the agricultural reform process, join other countries 
trying to prevent predatory behaviour of its investors in developing countries, and regionalise its 
food reserve. 
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Swiss Policies for more Food Security1 
_____________________________________________________________________
Introduction 
Swiss shops are full of food. We have nominally very high food prices but they are 
quite low in terms of purchasing power: less than 9% of an average family budget is 
spent on food, including French and Swiss wine and champagne, Italian and Swiss 
truffles, Bündnerfleisch from Argentina or the Grisons, and (off-seasonal) South 
African fruits. There are few poverty traps and a relatively tight social safety net, but 
there are the “working poor”. Local production covers 72% of net domestic 
consumption (2008/10).2 Trade agreements ensure market access for industrial goods 
and services exports, and these exports essentially finance Swiss food security. A vast 
and efficient food reserve scheme insures against import disruptions. Also, 
Switzerland has steadily increased development cooperation including for 
agriculture. 
Is there a problem? Are we food-secure when we import 3,000 tons of animal feed per 
day? Or should we more strongly pursue trade liberalisation so as to increase our 
purchasing capacity and decrease food prices? Should we give more money to dig for 
water in the Sahel area, or to subsidise irrigation in Switzerland? When we import 
Egyptian potatoes do poor Egyptians have less to eat? 
The main research questions to be addressed here are the following: 
1. Are most households in Switzerland food-secure? 
2. Is Switzerland food-secure? 
3. Is Switzerland contributing to or reducing global food security? 
The paper starts by recalling the basic tenets of food security definitions, 
misconceptions and possible contradictions, and production and price facts and 
trends (2). On the basis of the relevant international trade and investment rules (3) it 
then analyses the Swiss food security objectives and policies and their impact (4). The 
1 Revised version of my Speaking Notes for the Academia Engelberg’s 13th Dialogue on Science (15–
17 October 2014 on Food Security: http://www.academia-engelberg.ch/conference_2014.php5). 
German Title: ‚Schweizer Handels- und Investitionspolitiken für mehr Ernährungssicherheit?‘ A book 
chapter entitled ‘Ernährungssicherheit in der Schweiz’ with a similar content is in print. 
2 The main agricultural export is cheese: 1 Swiss cow out of 4 works for exports. Nonetheless, the 
shocking news in June 2014 was that for the first time in history net cheese imports by weight were 
bigger than exports. Interestingly, the negative balance of 450t was equivalent to about one year’s 
cheese exports to Russia (413t in 2013). See NZZ am Sonntag 24 August 2014, p.22 
 
                                                 
conclusions propose a number of avenues for more Swiss and more global food 
security (5). 1. State of Food Security 
The end of the last global food crisis dates back 5 years. An unfortunate coincidence 
of bad weather and poor harvests, low stocks, high oil prices and trade restrictions 
had sent prices skyrocketing and the number of hungry people worldwide rose above 
1 billion. Malthusian projections quickly added a number of structural developments 
to these basically cyclical factors. Most food security pundits saw the beginning of a 
catastrophe where demographic and climate change, new food consumption habits, 
increasing food waste, biofuels and speculation by vulture funds would lead to ever 
higher food and feed prices by the time the world population reaches 9 billion people, 
which it will as we all know sometime before 2050. 
In 2011 the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had to 
revise its figures but claimed that there were still way over 800 million hungry people 
and forecast continuously increasing food prices. The FAO also says that in a good 
year the world’s farmers can produce enough food for 12 billion humans. 
Surprisingly, the Agricultural Outlook 2014–23 co-published with the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) saw real prices slowly 
receding over the medium term, even for meat and dairy products.3 That was before 
Russia blocked food imports from certain countries, sending world markets and 
suppliers into another spin. However, the year 2014 has seen bumper harvests and 
severely falling commodity prices in the United States, India, China and many other 
countries.4 
These new data and perhaps global trends cannot be assessed here. But two sets of 
questions may be asked. 
First, definition: what is “food security”? In my opinion the internationally agreed 
definition is quite useless: “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food” (FAO 1996 and 2002). Rather, 
the crucial question is how this goal can be reached, and what role one should assign 
to (i) domestic production and technology development, (ii) national and foreign 
investment, (iii) international trade, and (iv) to stockpiles. For the same reason (and 
unlike for poverty) it is extremely difficult to measure “food insecurity”. Moreover, 
let us not forget that food security has very different implications, and sometimes 
conflicting interests, at the global, national and household levels. 
Second, speculation: why have the efforts by the G20 to combat food speculators 
failed? Economists eager to address excessive price volatility, but uneasy about 
defining “speculation”, are still debating whether public stocks and producer price 
guarantees really contribute to price stabilisation or, to the contrary, stifle other forms 
3 OECD/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2014), OECD-FAO Agricultural 
Outlook 
2014, OECD Publishing, pp.49–53. 
4 NZZ 20 October 2014, p.21. 
 
                                                 
of risk mitigation such as privately held stocks, commodity exchanges and producer 
insurance.5 
While there is no simple solution that will lead to more food security overall, it is also 
clear that some policy tools conflict. International cooperation and competition rules 
are sadly lacking but even more necessary in a globalising food value chain where 
high production and trade distortions are still being caused by agricultural, socio-
economic and environmental policies. 2. International framework for food (in-)security 
At present, what international rules do we have, what does this mean for national 
policies, and do these rules make agricultural trade fairer – or do they just limit policy 
space and prevent food sovereignty? 
The main rules framework for agricultural trade is the Agreement on Agriculture of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of 
1986–1994, when artificially low prices were mainly caused by export subsidies of 
Europe and the USA. For decades such subsidies had displaced production and 
discouraged investment in poor countries. I think it is mainly for that reason that 
Africa, both North and South of the Sahara, has become the world’s largest food 
importer. 
But let us first recall the main trade and investment rules, and what they can mean for 
food security. These rules are of four kinds as summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1: Food Security Impact of International Trade and Investment Rules 
Rules Food Security Impact 
1. Tariffs: The only border measures 
allowed are (negotiated and slightly 
reduced) maximum duties, with 
some limited safeguards. 
Import quantities (and periods) are 
no longer freely manageable. Trade 
is more foreseeable. For products 
with low tariffs, local producers 
face some competition from abroad. 
2. Farm Subsidies: there is no limit to 
direct payments e.g. for 
environmental or social policies. But 
(high) limits apply to direct product 
and price support. 
Product subsidies can still displace 
farmers in other countries (i) on 
their own markets and (ii) at home. 
3. Export subsidies: 1986–90 levels 
were reduced by roughly one third. 
“Surplus” disposal is more difficult. 
But other forms are still possible 
5 Extensive OECD research on risk management, for instance by way of insurance schemes with public 
support, shows not only the possibilities for improvement but also the complexity of good policy 
formulation. See Christopher Gilbert, International Agreements for Commodity Price Stabilisation: An 
Assessment. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, No. 53, OECD Publishing (2011). 
But see also Olivier De Schutter (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Food 
commodities speculation and food price crises: regulation to reduce the risks of price volatility. Briefing 
Note 2 September 2010. 
 
                                                 
No new ones can be introduced 
anywhere. 
(credits, food aid, state trading). 
There are more or less no limits for 
export restrictions. 
4. Investment protection: 3000 
bilateral investment protection 
treaties and many free trade 
agreements promote and protect 
foreign investors, often better than 
local investors. The same goes for 
international investment credits and 
risk guarantees. 
Cases of “land grab” and human 
rights violations can arise where the 
home state protects its investor 
even against a successor 
government in a host state trying to 
cancel such investment contracts. 
In my opinion these rules are a mixed bag but overall are beneficial for global food 
security. They leave considerable policy space at the national level. They do not and 
today cannot address the small farmer issue. However, the still allowed subsidy 
ceilings in particular do reduce market access and food security in other countries. 
Moreover, some disciplines such as those on export restrictions are too weak and at 
present cannot prevent unfair competition. With the failure of the Doha Round 
negotiation in 2008 the divide between the haves and have-nots remains considerable. 
Tariffs and product subsidies may have slightly come down, but developed countries 
especially can, at any moment, re-increase both. Agricultural protectionism is on the 
rise again – often in the name of food security! In short, the contribution of trade and 
investment to greater food security remains fraught with uncertainty. 
The fact that (for some countries) food dumping, export subsidies and restrictions are 
still allowed inevitably shapes policy making and negotiations. Pursuing food 
security by way of international trade looks good in economic theory but remains a 
risky proposition for responsible governments, even in essentially open economies. 
Understandably, the public stockpile option remains attractive despite its high cost 
and (for some of them) trade-distortive nature. Nonetheless, stockpiling may also 
maintain (i) inefficiencies which in turn prevent trade and investment, (ii) 
development policies that would provide small farmers with the tools to become 
more competitive and at least feed their own families, and (iii) supply policies by way 
of regional “virtual” stockpiles which would work against speculators. 
Governments worldwide are taking food security more seriously today than they did 
before the last big crisis of 2007–08. Unfortunately they often do this at the expense of 
farmers in other countries. What we are seeing again today is a “Race between 
Finance Ministers” which the WTO would be able to mitigate only with a successful 
conclusion of the Doha Round, and with a number of accompanying measures to 
compensate the “losers”. Not to mention the loose or non-existent disciplines for 
export restrictions and against “land grabbing”. Unfortunately, for the time being, 
prospects for a breakthrough are particularly bleak. On 16 October 2014, WTO 
Director General Azevedo said on the failure to agree on the Bali follow-up that 
“[t]his could be the most serious situation that this organization has ever faced.” 
In my opinion, the WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali (December 2013) has 
increased the divide between the UN- and WTO-enshrined food security concepts by 
temporarily allowing trade distortions to go unchallenged in WTO dispute 
 
settlement. In July 2014, India effectively ended WTO efforts to revive the Doha 
Round and to ensure a more level playing field for non-subsidised farmers. 
Interestingly India argued that it had to ensure its food security, and this gained the 
sympathies of many NGOs. The reality is different. As in Switzerland and in other 
countries including the EU (common agricultural policy (CAP)), food security is 
quickly becoming a marketing strategy under the guise of social policy and increased 
income support. In fact, thanks to a variety of subsidy instruments, India is fast 
becoming a big exporter, displacing rice from Pakistan, beef from Brazil, wheat from 
Argentina and sugar from Thailand. In short, it is following the old habits of Europe 
and the US! 
Politicians frequently equate farmer security with food security, never mind whether 
farmers in other countries lose income or poor consumers pay more for their food. 
That is good news for some farmers, less so for consumers and taxpayers, and often 
the consequence is neither more food security nor less price volatility. In fact, 
demands for more policy space and farm support may well result in efficiency losses 
coming at the expense of poor consumers (which is not the WTO’s business). 
Moreover – and this should very much be the WTO’s business – they also punish 
efficient farmers in other countries without the benefit of subsidies or guaranteed 
prices. Only apparently better would be a notion of small farm security. Indeed, 
today many small farmers are simply less productive than big ones. Permanently 
high tariffs are not a solution here, and poor countries have simply no way of 
subsidising all their small farms. For the sake of global food security, the WTO must 
therefore continue to act as a bulwark against agricultural policies affording 
protection at the expense of more efficient farmers. 3. What is Switzerland supposed to do? 
Positing here that at the national level food can only be produced or imported (with 
public stocks as a food security option by way of deferred consumption), there are 
basically three policies shaping Swiss food security. Each is based on a mandate in the 
Federal Constitution: agricultural policies, stockpile policies, and trade and 
investment policies.6 Table 2 presents them in a nutshell. 
Table 2: Swiss Federal Constitution: Food Security-related objectives and instruments 
Objectives and Instruments Food Security Connotation 
1. Art.104: Agricultural policies have 
three different (“multifunctional”) 
objectives: contributions to food 
security, sustainable and market-
Food security is often misunderstood 
as farm income security. 
• Nature, multiple policy objectives 
6 In addition, Swiss development policies provide institutional support, extension services and 
subsidised inputs but small farmers are rarely able to manage production risks and become more 
resilient to price shocks and climate change. Local food security remains low, and in the Asian and 
African countries which have benefitted from technical cooperation for fifty years most farmers cannot 
even feed their own families. For Switzerland’s international investment policies there is no 
constitutional article other than Article 101 referred to here. 
 
                                                 
oriented production/landscape 
management, and decentralised 
settlement. 
Switzerland often professes 
sustainability but its own food 
security is predominantly ensured by 
taxpayers and imports. 
and the lack of competition 
reduce productivity and thus 
Swiss food security, and they 
increase consumer prices. 
• Food security is not attainable 
even with closed borders – and 
would be definitely cheaper with 
more imports. 
2. Art.102 (Economic Supply 
policies): Government-mandated 
but privately owned stockpiles 
ensure food supplies for 6 months 
in times of disruptions. 
The system is quite efficient (2010: 15 
SFR per resident and year). But why 
does it include sugar (and with levies 
only for imported sugar) when 
Switzerland is basically a net sugar 
(re-)exporter? 
• If we consider food security as a 
public good it should be paid for 
by taxpayers rather than by 
consumers. 
• Additional protection is afforded 
to domestic producers at the 
expense of food security in 
developing countries: 
o Levies are higher for 
sugar (16 SFR) than for 
rice (4.75 SFR) 
o The levies for vegetable 
oils, wheat and feedstuffs 
apply even to least 
developed country 
suppliers. 
3. Art.101 (Foreign Economic 
Policy): Trade agreements with 
developing countries provide very 
limited concessions for 
agricultural products. 
Switzerland faces increasing 
difficulties to negotiate new 
agreements, in part because of its 
agricultural protection. This also 
prevents better trade opportunities 
through regional integration. 
• Lack of market access guarantees 
reduces Swiss food security. 
• Cash crops from more efficient 
farmers cannot compete here. 
• Zero duty preferences for the 
poorest countries can be 
withdrawn at any time. 
Taken together the food security contribution by these four sectoral policies appears 
mutually constrained: Swiss agriculture is protected by some of the world’s highest 
tariffs and subsidies. The Doha Round would not have solved the problems of small 
farmers, but its failure means that in Switzerland huge payments by surface, product 
 
subsidies and some production quotas still substitute market signals with rent 
maximisation. Food exports are still subsidised (“Schoggigesetz”), as well as (WTO-
illegally) exports of live animals and surplus butter. Producers look at “Berne” rather 
than at their markets. Investment remains over-regulated and over-protected and 
therefore often misguided. 4. Need for changes for more food security  
Unfortunately, immediate food security improvement prospects look bleak, both for 
the world and for Switzerland. If the “9 Billion Challenge” is to be met by 2050, 
changes are necessary at both levels. 
1) World 
Unless the numerous anti-small farm policy biases are removed, subsistence farmers 
and nomads will not even feed themselves, let alone the world. Besides, small 
farmers are not obviously more climate change-resilient or more water-efficient than 
big ones. Is there a solution? The goal remains the same with or without a change of 
the rules, namely to allow big and small competitive farmers to feed the world 
efficiently, including poor consumers (except the destitute and the refugees who in 
the short term can only be helped by food aid).7 
International standards and rules for production, trade and investments require 
continuous development and progressive further reforms. From a food security 
perspective, the overall objective for such reforms must be to ensure equal 
opportunities between nations with different resource and financial endowments, 
and sustainable production including by effective small and family farm policies. 
2) Switzerland 
The erstwhile agricultural reform of the nineteen-nineties and early zeroes has come 
to a standstill. More recently it has even been partly reversed. While “food security” 
is a constitutional principle, in 2013 the notion of “food sovereignty” was added to 
the Swiss Agricultural Law, without anyone having a clear idea what changes it 
involves besides new subsidies. The paralysing effect of Swiss agricultural policies is 
exacerbated by the huge new direct payments for food security. Moreover, two new 
people’s initiatives might yet increase the splendid isolation which in effect reduces 
Swiss farmers’ competitiveness and global food security. Without a successful 
conclusion of the Doha Round or an ambitious Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement (TTIP) further market openings leading to more efficiency in 
Switzerland remain highly unlikely. Even more difficult (yet strongly advisable from 
a food security perspective) seems to be a consequent “re-coupling” of taxpayer 
support to public goods production. 
In my opinion and if this country is really bent on increasing its food security without 
impairing that of other countries and of poor farmers, there is no way around a 
7 46 million US citizens or 15% of the population receive food aid, while according to the FAO some 43 
million people are thought to be at risk of food poverty in Europe (FAO Review, undated, using data 
from IBRD, State of poverty in Europe 1990, 1995, 2000, 2007). 
 
                                                 
resumption of the agricultural reform process. Here are four recommendations for 
further analysis. 
1. Swiss farmers must gradually become competitive and produce food at world 
or European market prices. The efficient production of public goods such as 
environmental and social policies must be taxpayer-financed. This will also 
help the food industry and reduce its need for border protection and export 
subsidies (“Schoggigesetz”). 
2. Switzerland should regionalise its food reserve strategy, along the principles 
and methods which have been used since the 1970s by the International 
Energy Agency, and which today are starting to work in East Asia and in 
West Africa. 
3. Switzerland should develop its trade relations with developing countries 
which finance their food security with cash crop exports. 
4. Switzerland should join other countries in trying to prevent predatory 
behaviour of their investors in developing countries. 
 
 
 
